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Abstract. The literature on transboundary river management
suggests that institutions play an important role in bringing
about cooperation. However, knowledge about how such in-
stitutions should be designed in order to do so remains lim-
ited. One way to learn more about adequate institutional de-
sign is to assess the effectiveness of existing regimes, and
to trace the causal relationships that lead to the respective
outcomes. In order to gain further insights into the relation-
ship between institutional design and regime effectiveness,
this paper presents a study on the water quality regime of
the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe
(ICPE). The analysis is based on a review of pertinent docu-
ments and ten qualitative interviews with Czech and German
Commission members and NGO representatives. Particular
emphasis has been put on determining the ICPE’s specific
contribution and the no-regime counterfactual as well as on
the perceived expediency of the institutional arrangements.
The study shows overall that the countries were relatively
successful in improving water quality in the Elbe basin.
However, this outcome can only partly be attributed to the
ICPE itself. Furthermore, the ICPE’s contribution towards
achieving the various goals varied significantly between the
different areas of activity: it was relatively significant where
the main responsibility for action lay with the public author-
ities, such as in the area of wastewater treatment and the es-
tablishment of an international alarm plan and model, but
was practically non-existent in the reduction of non-point
pollution from agriculture, where success depended on the
behavior of individual private actors (farmers). The com-
mission contributed towards problem solving by serving as
a forum for the joint identification of priorities for action
from a basin-wide perspective. The resulting international
obligations increased the power of national water administra-
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tions and their access to funds. At the same time, the Com-
mission’s reporting to the public served as an enforcement
mechanism. From a methodological point of view, the paper
highlights the opportunities and limitations of a combined
quantitative and qualitative approach to determining regime
effectiveness.
1 The problem
In recent years, a discourse has emerged on conflict and co-
operation in the management of international transboundary
rivers (Gleick, 1993; Rogers, 1993; Waterbury, 1994; Bar-
rett, 1994; Bernauer, 1997; Wolf, 1998; Gleditsch et al.,
2006; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). In this context it has been
observed that, despite predictions of conflict, quite a num-
ber of international river basins have seen the establishment
of international agreements and also the setting up of river
basin organizations (Wolf, 1998; UNEP, 2002; Dombrowsky,
2007a). Furthermore, it has been suggested that institutions
are an important explanatory variable with regard to cooper-
ation (e.g. Wolf et al., 2003). At the same time, knowledge
about adequate institutional design for the management of
international rivers remains limited (Bernauer, 1997). While
some progress has been made in explicating the negotiation
strategies and external conditions under which the formation
of international water institutions or regimes can be expected
(LeMarquand, 1977; Durth, 1996; Marty, 2001; Espey and
Towfique, 2004; Sadoff and Grey, 2002; Song and Whit-
tington, 2004; Dinar, 2006; Lindemann, 2006; Dombrowsky,
2007a, b), there is still no full convergence of opinion among
the various authors. Furthermore, the establishment of an in-
ternational water regime does not provide any guarantees that
it will ultimately contribute towards problem solving. Thus,
if ultimately we want to learn more about adequate institu-
tional design we also need to study the effectiveness of the
respective international regime and to trace the underlying
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
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causal effects (e.g. Underdal, 1992; Bernauer, 1995; Helm
and Sprinz, 2000).
However, rigorous studies on the effectiveness of interna-
tional water regimes remain rare .(Bernauer, 2002). Range-
ley et al. (1994) claim that many international water treaties
in Africa have remained “paper tigers”, but the evidence re-
mains at an anecdotal level. Other authors point out the
obstacles faced in implementing the water-related provision
in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty of 1994 or the 1995
Oslo B Agreement among Israelis and Palestinians (e.g.
Edig, 2001; Dombrowsky, 2003; Fischhendler, 2007). Fis-
chhendler et al. (2004) analyze recent difficulties in imple-
menting the 1944 Boundary Waters Treaty concluded be-
tween Mexico and the United States.
An exception, both in terms of more rigorous effectiveness
analyses and in terms of the relative success of the underly-
ing regime, is the 1987 Rhine Action Program of the Interna-
tional Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR)
which has been hailed as a success story of international
river cooperation (Durth, 1996; Bernauer and Moser, 1996;
Gurtner-Zimmermann, 1998; Holtrup, 1999; Verweij, 2000).
In this context, the literature threw up a number of factors
that are considered as drivers for the perceived success of
ICPR, including: a joint vision; a phased approach with
achievable targets; technical dialogue among those responsi-
ble for implementation; implementation at the national level;
monitoring through publication of national reports; admis-
sion of NGOs; a small secretariat; and the non-binding char-
acter of the action program (e.g. Holtrup, 1999). However,
even in the case of the Rhine the relationship between insti-
tutional design and outcome is not entirely clear. Bernauer
and Moser (1996) point out the fact that much of the success
can be attributed to independent activities at national level.
Gurtner-Zimmermann (1998), who explicitly studied the ef-
fectiveness of the Rhine Action Program, did not relate the
outcome to the institutional set-up. Holtrup (1999) on the
other hand did not establish the causal relationship between
institutional design and regime outcomes. This indicates that
further research on the relationship between institutional de-
sign and regime effectiveness is warranted, not only for the
Rhine but also beyond this river basin.
In order to gain further insight into the relationship be-
tween institutional design and regime effectiveness, this pa-
per presents a study of the water quality regime of the Inter-
national Commission for the Protection of the Elbe (ICPE).
The Elbe has been selected because the Elbe regime draws
heavily on the Rhine model (Holtrup, 1999). However, in
contrast to the Rhine, the Elbe riparian countries are char-
acterized by greater economic inequality. Hence, the Elbe
can be considered a test case for whether it was possible to
transfer the Rhine model to more asymmetric economic con-
ditions. The Elbe thus represents an example of an upstream-
downstream water quality conflict, where the upstream coun-
try is in an advantageous situation from a hydrological point
of view but the downstream country is so from an economic
point of view. Also, the literature on the ICPE remains sparse
and, to the author’s knowledge, no rigorous study of the ef-
fectiveness of the ICPE water quality regime has so far been
carried out. The study looks at the period 1990–2004/5 –
that is, before the substantive implementation of the Euro-
pean Union Water Framework Directive (WFD) in the Elbe
Basin and the reform of the ICPE – in order to assess the
effects of voluntary cooperation mechanisms (for an assess-
ment of the effects of the WFD on international cooperation
in the Rhine and Elbe Basins, see Mo¨llenkamp, (2007)).
Against this background, this study seeks to contribute to
the literature on transboundary water management by ana-
lyzing the expediency of the transboundary institutional ar-
rangements in the Elbe basin, based on an effectiveness anal-
ysis and on tracing the causal relationships that led to the
respective outcomes. Section 2 will introduce the underly-
ing theory and methodology for measuring and explaining
regime effectiveness. Section 3 will describe the Elbe wa-
ter quality regime. Section 4 will analyze the effectiveness
of the Elbe water quality regime. Section 5 will explain the
outcome and Sect. 6 will draw conclusions.
2 Theory and methodology
2.1 Measuring and explaining regime effectiveness
One way to determine whether the institutional design of an
international regime is adequate is to assess its effectiveness.
In this context, institutions can be understood as the formal
and informal “rules of the game” (e.g. North, 1990). The
term “international regime” refers to the “implicit and ex-
plicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making proce-
dures around which actors” expectations converge in a given
area of international relations’ (Krasner, 1983). Thus, a
regime is constituted by institutions.1
Generally speaking, a regime can be understood to be ef-
fective if it solves the problems it addresses (Haas et al.,
1993; Young and Levy, 1999). Therefore, in order to assess
effectiveness, a first step would be to determine whether the
goals of the regime have been met (measuring the outcome)
(Underdal, 1992). In the case of transboundary water, this
could be done by measuring whether certain water quality
targets have been met. However, it may often be difficult to
measure the outcome of a regime; for instance, there may be
a time lag between certain activities and changes in the envi-
ronment. In this case, an initial approximation towards mea-
suring effectiveness is to measure compliance (e.g. Chayes
and Chayes, 1993), i.e. whether the respective actors ad-
1An analytical distinction is usually drawn between institutions
and organizations, where organizations refer to the “players of the
game” pursuing a common goal (North, 1990). This notwithstand-
ing, organizations are also constituted by rules. Although they are
constituted by rules, they also include the players pursuing certain
goals.
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hered to the rules they set up and delivered the promised ac-
tion (measuring output) (Underdal, 1992). However, compli-
ance is not a sufficient condition for effectiveness, as a high
level of compliance may not necessarily translate into a high
level of effectiveness. As Downs et al. (1996) point out, it
may often be easy for states to comply, as the respective in-
ternational agreements do not ask them to make substantial
contributions towards the cooperation problem.
Conversely, even if the respective goals have been met and
the underlying problems solved, the question is still whether
a causal link exists between the international regime and the
respective outcome. The reason for this is that other (ex-
ternal) factors, such as measures taken at the national or sub-
national level – regardless of the international regime in place
– or changes in production, may have contributed towards the
achievement of the respective environmental goals. There-
fore, we should treat institutional design and external factors
separately in explaining regime outcomes.
Against this background, the so called Oslo-Potsdam so-
lution for measuring effectiveness identifies two benchmarks
against which the actual performance (AP) of an interna-
tional regime can be measured: first, the collective optimum
(CO) and, second, the no-regime counterfactual (NR), as il-
lustrated in Fig. 1 (Underdal, 1992; Helm and Sprinz, 2000;
Hovi et al., 2003).
The collective optimum (CO) may be defined in differ-
ent ways (Young and Levy, 1999). It could be argued that
the collective optimum is achieved if the respective goals are
met. In addition, from an economic perspective, the collec-
tive optimum would be achieved if the net gains of coop-
eration were maximized (cost efficiency) or if certain goals
were met at least cost (cost effectiveness). One could also
ask if the goals are achieved in a fair manner (Bernauer,
1995; Young and Levy, 1999). From a methodological point
of view, it will usually be more demanding to determine
whether the respective goals are met in an efficient and fair
manner than merely asking about goals achieved. In this
study, we will assume that the goals set by the actors involved
represent the “collective optimum”, and for methodological
reasons (especially the monetarization of the benefits of im-
proved environmental conditions) we will refrain from con-
ducting a cost-benefit analysis.
The no-regime counterfactual (NR) is the hypothetical
state of the world that would have occurred if no regime had
been put in place. In the language of game theory, it can
be understood as the non-cooperative solution to an interna-
tional cooperation problem that would follow from the unco-
ordinated choices of each actor’s best reply to the strategies
of the other actors (the so-called Nash solution). Measur-
ing the no-regime counterfactual is particularly challenging.
One way is to trace in depth the causal effects that led to ac-
tual performance. Another may be to build scenarios, start-
ing with the state of the world that existed before the regime
and asking what consequences would have flowed from the
previous “rules of the game”. A third strategy would be to
level of instrument use (e.g. emission reduction)
NR: no regime counter-factual
AP: actual performance
CO: collective optimum
Effectiveness score E = (AP - NR)/(CO - NR)
NR AP CO
Fig. 1. Measuring Regime Effectiveness (after Helm and Sprinz,
2000:637).
study a large number of comparable cases with and without a
regime in place. However, in the case of transboundary water
management the latter strategy is likely to fail due to the fact
that we are dealing with many explanatory variables and rela-
tively few comparable cases. Therefore, in this study we will
mainly follow the first strategy by tracing the causal relation-
ships and by asking how the international regime contributed
towards actual performance. Based on these relationships,
values will be assessed for the no-regime counterfactual.
On the basis of actual performance (AP), the no-regime
counterfactual (NR) and the collective optimum (CO), the
effectiveness score E with 0≤E≤1 can be defined as indi-
cated in Fig. 1. It allows the regime’s actual contribution
over and above what would have happened in the absence of
the regime (AP-NR) to be placed in relation to its best possi-
ble contribution (CO-NR). A value of E close to 0 indicates
a low level of effectiveness, whereas values of E close to 1
indicate a high level of effectiveness. One advantage of E
is that it allows for a comparison of different international
regimes.
2.2 Databases and approach
The analysis is based on two sources of information: first,
relevant documents by the ICPE and, second, expert inter-
views. The ICPE not only produces publications about its
action programs but also issues regular progress reports on
their implementation, as well as other environmental and ge-
ographical background data. This information was reviewed
and evaluated.
In addition, expert interviews were carried out. The inter-
views were of a semi-structured nature and were based on a
standardized questionnaire. The interview partners were first
asked to score the level of overall goal achievement and to
explain their scores. In a second step, they were requested
to score the achievement of objectives in the different ar-
eas of activity and to outline how the ICPE had contributed
towards achieving the objectives, in order to assess the no-
regime counterfactual. In a third step, they were asked to
assess the expediency of the institutional design. In this way,
the information provided makes it possible to approach the
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Seemannshöft
Geesthacht
Schnackenburg
Ústí nad Labem
Schmilka/Hřensko
N
Fig. 2. Elbe River basin with main gauging stations (triangles) and
fish passes (squares) (based on http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/
publication/freshwater europe/images/map9.jpg (24 April 2007)).
question of institutional design from two angles: from the
point of view of regime effectiveness, and through a direct
evaluation of the institutional design.
In order to get “insider” views from the two riparian states,
interviews were conducted with three representatives of the
Czech and the German ICPE delegation respectively includ-
ing heads of delegation or working groups, and members of
the working groups on Action Programs and on Ecology, the
main working groups in charge of the action programs. In
addition, a representative of the ICPE Secretariat was in-
terviewed. The Secretariat can be considered as a “neu-
tral” insider with in-depth information on progress achieved.
In addition to these insider perspectives, two German and
one Czech representative of environmental NGOs were in-
terviewed in order to gain an outsider view, as they had
not been involved in the definition of the activities prior to
2004. In the Czech Republic it was possible only to iden-
tify one NGO representative dealing with transboundary wa-
ters. The person did not feel in a position to come up with
scores, given that she had only recently become involved in
the topic. By and large, only environmental NGOs have par-
ticipated to date in activities related to the ICPE and the im-
plementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in the
Elbe Basin. Therefore, no representatives of the agricultural
and industrial sectors were interviewed, as it is unlikely that
they would have been able to contribute towards the scoring
exercise. The interviews were fully transcribed and a content
analysis carried out.
Thus, the study combined qualitative and quantitative
methods. While a higher number of interviewees would have
been desirable for the statistical analysis, the number was de-
liberately restricted in order to be able to carry out in-depth
interviews; this made it possible, inter alia, to provide expla-
nations of the scores provided. This was important for two
reasons. First, it enabled the underlying causal relationships
between institutional design and regime effectiveness to be
identified. Second, the explanations provided by the intervie-
wees allowed their scores to be interpreted – these scores, of
course, are not only subjective and a matter of interpretation;
different participants may also have had different motivations
for influencing the scores in one way or another. Also, it ap-
pears that the number of individuals who are acquainted with
the various components of the Action Programs is limited,
so in that sense it is questionable whether it would have been
possible to achieve a significantly higher number of substan-
tiated expert scores.
3 The Elbe water quality regime
The Elbe River is shared by four countries: Germany, the
Czech Republic, Austria and Poland. However, more than
99% of the basin area of 148 268 square kilometers (km2) is
located in Germany and the Czech Republic, with shares of
65.5% and 33.7% respectively (IKSE, 2005a) (see Fig. 2).
Within Germany, the river basin extends over ten of the six-
teen German states (La¨nder).
Historically, the first issue that gave rise to transboundary
cooperation in the Elbe river basin was navigation and main-
tenance of the river bed, the first treaty being signed in 1811
(McCaffrey, 2003). After the Second World War, water-
related cooperation between West Germany on the one side
and the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic on the other was largely inhibited by the
cold war (Durth, 1996). At the same time, growing problems
of pollution increased the tension between the riparian states.
By the end of 1980s, the Elbe was one of the most heavily
polluted rivers in Europe (IKSE, 1991b). The situation of
non-cooperation changed rapidly after the fall of the Berlin
wall and, as early as in October 1990, Czechoslovakia, the
freshly reunited German Federal Republic and the European
Community founded the International Commission for the
Protection of the Elbe (ICPE).2
2Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the European Economic
Community on the International Commission for the Protection of
the Elbe, Magdeburg, 8 October 1990. After the rescission of the
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The convention aims at preventing the pollution of the
Elbe and its drainage area, and at reducing North Sea pol-
lution. It is explicitly not concerned with fisheries or navi-
gation. The geographical scope of the ICPE extends across
the drainage basin in the Czech Republic and Germany. The
detailed objectives of the ICPE are:
1. to enable use to be made of the river, in particular for
obtaining supplies of drinking water from bank-filtered
waters and for agricultural use of the waters and sedi-
ments;
2. to achieve as natural an ecosystem as possible with a
healthy diversity of species;
3. to reduce substantially North Sea pollution coming from
the Elbe area.
In order to achieve these objectives, the ICPE prepared two
action programs: the First Action Program (fast-track pro-
gram) 1992–1995 (IKSE, 1991a), and the Elbe Action Pro-
gram 1996–2010 (IKSE, 1995b). The First Action Program
foresaw the construction of 139 sewerage treatment plants in
the basin and a 30% reduction in the concentration of 15 in-
dustrial priority substances. The 1995 Elbe Action Program
comprised a comprehensive program of measures in seven
areas of activity: (1) municipal wastewater treatment, (2) in-
dustrial wastewater treatment, (3) reduction of agricultural
non-point pollution, (4) reduction of pollution from contam-
inated sites and landfills, (5) improvement of river continuity
for fish migration, (6) establishment of protected areas and
improvement of morphology, and (7) the prevention of acci-
dental pollution. In addition, in 2003 the ICPE devised an
Action Plan on Flood Control (IKSE, 2003a).
The organizational structure of the ICPE consists of:
– the Commission (3 delegations of up to 5 members
each, plus experts) and its President;
– a Coordination Group;
– the Secretariat in Magdeburg tasked with preparing, im-
plementing and supporting the commission’s work; and
– different, changing Working Groups and Sub-Working
Groups, consisting of delegates or experts appointed by
each delegation.
IPCE decisions have to be unanimous. They are recom-
mendations to the member states and are not legally binding
(Epiney and Felder, 2002:82; Reinhardt and Caßor-Pfeiffer,
2006:17). Each party bears the costs of representation and
Slovak Republic in 1994, the members of ICPE were the Czech Re-
public, Germany and the European Community. With the accession
of the Czech Republic to the European Union in May 2005, the Eu-
ropean Union withdrew from the treaty. Austria and Poland have
only observer status. They are, however, fully involved in ongoing
efforts to implement the WFD in the basin.
investigations on its own territory. The contributions to the
costs of the secretariat are allocated as follows: Germany
pays 65%, the Czech Republic 32.5% and the EU 2.5%. In
order to monitor progress, the commission provides the par-
ties with regular progress reports. No formal provisions exist
for enforcement or dispute settlement.
4 Measuring the effectiveness of the Elbe water quality
regime
4.1 Achievement of overall goals
4.1.1 Achievement of ICPE target values
In order to monitor the achievement of its goals, the ICPE
has developed desirable target values for a list of priority sub-
stances. They are not legally binding on member states and
there is apparently no temporal commitment by the member
states to achieve these targets. They are used as an orienta-
tion to evaluate the status quo and, as suggested by one inter-
viewee, were themselves the results of a bargaining process,
representing compromise values.
The target values are being measured at the three gaug-
ing stations Schmilka/Hrˇensko on the Czech-German border,
Schnackenburg on the former German-German border, and
Seemannsho¨ft in the delta area (see Fig. 2). No target values
were specified for Goal 3, the protection of the North Sea.
Depending on use, goal achievement is being measured for
selected substances in the water or the sediment phase, as in-
dicated in Table 1 (IKSE, 1998:7, Annex 2). It summarizes
goal achievement for the year 2004 and lists problematic sub-
stances (IKSE, 2005b:25 and Annex 1).
With respect to Goal 1a – the use of Elbe water for drink-
ing water production, fisheries and irrigation – the level of
achievement is relatively high, as targets for 18 out of 26 pri-
ority substances were met at all three gauging stations. In
addition, three of the eight substances above target, namely
total nitrogen, total phosphorus and hexachlorbenzene, were
close to target. Furthermore, Mercury, AOX and EDTA were
only significantly above target at Seemannsho¨ft, which ap-
pears to be a recent development. With respect to Goal 1b
– the use of Elbe sediments in agriculture – the level of
achievement is low, as targets for only two of twelve sub-
stances were met at all three measuring stations. With respect
to Goal 2 – the protection of aquatic ecosystems – only a mi-
nority of target values, both in the water and the sediment
phase, were met at all three gauging stations. (In the wa-
ter phase, two of the sixteen substances above target, namely
chemical oxygen demand and nitrogen, were close to the tar-
get.)
Thus, it can be argued that on the basis of the ICPE indica-
tors the level of goal achievement is relatively high with re-
spect to Goal 1a, but further efforts will be needed to improve
the quality of sediments for their use in agriculture (Goal 1b)
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Table 1. Achievement of overall goals.
Goals 1a. Use of water for wa-
ter supply, fisheries & irri-
gation
1b. Use of sediments in
agriculture
2. Protection of aquatic
eco-systems
3. Protection of North Sea
ICPE target values
met in 2004
18 of 26 in water phase
(69%)
2 of 12 in sediment phase
(17%)
10 of 26 in water phase
(38%)
2 of 9 in sediment phase
(22%)
Not specified
Problematic
substances
CSB, (TOC), Hg, AOX,
EDTA
Hg, Cd, Zn, Tributyl-tin-
compounds, Hexachlorben-
zen & AOX
Hg, Cd, Zn, Cu, As,
Tributyl-tin-compounds
Hexachlorbenzene, AOX,
EDTA
Not specified
Avg. score 7.3 – 6.3 6.5
Coefficient of
variation
0.23 – 0.23 0.24
Explanations by
Interviewees
Significant improvement of
the water quality has taken
place.
Consumption of larger
quantities of Elbe fish still
not advisable.
Drinking water rarely pro-
duced from Elbe water =
symbolic goal
Some improvements, but
sediments can only be used
in the long run.
Old contaminants are (only)
remobilized and washed out
during floods.
Sediment use is not of prac-
tical relevance = symbolic
goal
Good starting conditions at
Middle Elbe, due to low
regulation.
Ecosystems have benefited
from improved water qual-
ity vs. fish diversity has not
increased as expected and
only few fish species repro-
duce naturally
Priority substances have de-
creased, but nutrient loads
are still too high for North
Sea.
North Sea was only added
for political reasons.
and to achieve a water and sediment quality that is satisfac-
tory for the maintenance of aquatic ecosystems (Goal 2).
4.1.2 Expert scores
Given the difficulty of capturing complex goals using chemi-
cal indicators, the interview participants were asked in a sec-
ond step to evaluate the achievement of the three goals on a
scale of 0 to 10 and to explain their rating. Table 1 lists the
average scores given in the interviews, the respective coeffi-
cients of variation, and the main explanations provided.
Overall, Goal 1a received the highest scores, with an av-
erage of 7.3, and Goal 2 the lowest, with an average of 6.3.
The average score for Goal 3 was 6.5. With respect to the
scores, two main observations can be made. First, the scores
differed significantly among the experts, as reflected by co-
efficients that varied between 0.23 and 0.24. The reason can
at least partly be found in their explanations, which indicate
that the participants – at least sometimes – had different per-
ceptions of what needed to happen in order to achieve the
different goals.
Second, given the differences in the achievement of ICPE
target values between Goal 1a and Goal 2 discussed in
Sect. 4.1.1, it is interesting to note that the average scores
for Goals 1a and 2 are not far apart from each other, with
averages of 7.3 and 6.3 respectively. The participants were
obviously more optimistic with regard to the level of achieve-
ment of Goal 2 than one would have expected on the basis of
the objective measurement. One possible explanation for this
is that the state of ecosystems in the Middle Elbe in partic-
ular is generally considered to be quite satisfactory, despite
a mediocre sediment quality. Another explanation is that the
commission members did not want to score their achieve-
ments too poorly, although one NGO representative also gave
a score of 7. It is also worth noting that none of the par-
ticipants actually referred to the ICPE target values in their
evaluations.
Based on the two assessments, it can be concluded that
the level of achievement is fairly high with respect to human
uses of the river water, but that the water and sediment qual-
ity still needs to be improved to allow for the reuse of sed-
iments and to protect ecosystems and the North Sea. There
is, however, some discrepancy between the indicator-based
evaluation and the experts’ evaluation of the state of the Elbe
ecosystems, insofar as the experts were more optimistic with
regard to the state of the aquatic ecosystems than one would
have expected on the basis of the chemical analysis.
While overall the level of goal achievement may be con-
sidered to be medium to high, this does not yet explain
whether the ICPE has actually contributed towards achiev-
ing these goals. Therefore, Sect. 4.2 will analyze compliance
with the measures.
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Table 2. Compliance with measures.
Area of Activity Summary of Progress Reports Level of Compliance (Au-
thor’s evaluation based on
reports)
1. Municipal wastewater Virtually all planned WWTP completed or under way,
even before target.
Very high
2. Industrial point sources Proposed measures carried out: discharges of large in-
dustries regularly published; minimal requirements for
different branches of industry defined.
Very high
3. Agricultural non-point
sources
Recommendations on good practices made and moni-
toring of ongoing activities as planned. (Specific mea-
sures were not foreseen.)
High
4. Contaminated sites
and landfills
Relevant sites listed and rehabilitation measures mon-
itored: 90% of planned measures under way and 55%
realized by end of 2002.
High
5. Fish migration Initial key measures realized. Ongoing; 25% of planned
measures realized by 2004.
Low to medium (ongoing)
6. Protected areas and
morphology
Ongoing; 25% of planned measures implemented by
end of 2002. Changing targets.
Low to medium (ongoing)
7. Accidental pollution Proposed measures carried out: International Warning
and Alarm Plan agreed and updated; Elbe Alarm Model
operational; hazardous plants published; recommenda-
tions on accident prevention made.
Very high
4.2 Compliance with action program measures
In order to determine compliance with planned activities, it
was analyzed whether the measures provided for in the First
Action Program and the Elbe Action Program had actually
been carried out. This analysis was based on the respec-
tive ICPE progress reports (IKSE, 1995a, 1998, 2000, 2003b,
2005b). The findings are summarized in Table 2.
In most areas of activity, the member states show high
to very high levels of compliance. The only exceptions are
fish migration, the delineation of protected areas and the im-
provement of river morphology, where the 2004 level of com-
pliance can be considered as low to medium. However, it
should be noted that activities in these areas are still ongoing
until 2010.
Thus, overall the level of compliance can be considered to
be high. However, this is not sufficient to indicate whether
this actually contributed towards achieving the overall goals.
Therefore, in Sect. 4.3 actual performance and the no-regime
counterfactual will be assessed for each area of activity of the
1995 Elbe Action Program.
4.3 The effectiveness of the Elbe Action Program
In order to assess the current level of effectiveness of the Elbe
Action Program (1996-2010), an attempt was made to come
up with numerical values for the actual performance (AP)
and the no-regime counterfactual (NR) in each area of ac-
tivity; the effectiveness scores were then calculated on this
basis.
4.3.1 Actual performance
In order to determine actual performance, the participants
were asked to score the level of objective achievement in the
different areas of activity. The average scores, the coeffi-
cients of variation and the main explanations provided are
shown in Table 3.
Average scores are high (above 8) with respect to reduc-
ing pollution from municipal wastewater and preventing ac-
cidental pollution. This was somewhat expected, given the
high level of compliance in these areas. But for most other
areas as well, namely abatement of industrial pollution, de-
lineation of protected areas, improvement of fish migration
and abatement of pollution from contaminated sites, the av-
erage scores are fairly high, notwithstanding lower levels of
compliance in some of them. The only area where the level
of achievement is considered very low is the abatement of
agricultural non-point pollution – despite high levels of com-
pliance.
Much like the scores for the overall goals, the evaluations
differed among the participants, although not as much as with
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Table 3. Areas of activity – experts’ assessment and explanation of actual performance.
Area of Activity APP Coefficient of
variation
Explanations by Interviewees
1. Municipal wastewater 8.5 0.18 All planned WWTPs have been constructed vs. EU Ur-
ban Wastewater Directive not yet met vs. oversized in-
frastructure in East Germany (NGO statement).
2. Industrial point sources 7.2 0.15 Main polluters targeted vs. smaller companies not yet
addressed vs. impact of minimal requirements unclear.
3. Agricultural non-point
sources
2.7 0.71 No improvement vs. some improvement due to decline
in agricultural production and EU directives/agricultural
policy.
4. Contaminated sites
and landfills
6.8 0.20 Progress with respect to sites listed vs. contamination in
tributaries remains high.
5. Fish migration 6.8 0.13 Many priorities were implemented vs. progress in
Czech Republic limited to border area only; more to be
done in tributaries; morphology of main stem remains a
problem.
6. Protected areas and
morphology
7.4 0.13 Good progress under given framework conditions vs.
limited progress in Czech Republic.
7. Accidental pollution 8.4 0.10 Very advanced alarm system and prediction model vs.
deficits in its application.
respect to overall goal achievement. For most areas of activ-
ity, the coefficient of variation of the respective scores is in
the order of 0.1 to 0.2, with the notable exception of the case
of non-agricultural pollution, where the coefficient of vari-
ation is 0.7. When analyzing the explanations provided, it
becomes clear that the participants again used different ref-
erence points for their evaluation. A potential explanation
is that the Elbe Action Program only specifies planned ac-
tivities in each area of activity but does not explicitly state
objectives. Hence, when asked to score the achievement of
objectives in the various areas, some participants referred to
the planned measures and others to the perceived overall ob-
jectives in the sector. In particular, in the case of agricultural
non-point pollution, most commission members thought that
some moderate progress had been made overall in the sector,
while the NGO representatives gave scores of zero, as they
did not see any impact by the ICPE.
Despite the relatively low number of experts interviewed,
the differences in interpretation mentioned above, and the
possibility that participants were biased in their assessments
for the sake of illustration, the average scores will be used in
the following to reflect the actual performance (APP) of the
Elbe Action Program on a scale from 0 to 10.
4.3.2 Specific ICPE contribution and no-regime counter-
factual
In order to assess what would have happened if the ICPE
had not been in place, the participants were asked to identify
what the specific ICPE contribution had been in the different
areas of activity. The findings are summarized in Table 4
and discussed below for the different areas of activity; these
explanations are important for understanding how the ICPE
works and how the institutional arrangements come into play.
In the area of reducing pollution from municipal wastew-
ater, the main activities were the construction and extension
of a list of priority wastewater treatment plants in the Elbe
basin. It was argued that by defining an international list of
priority actions, the ICPE facilitated access to EU and na-
tional funds in a situation where different economic sectors
were competing for structural funds and other financial re-
sources. Furthermore, the regular publication of progress re-
ports by the ICPE created pressure on the respective admin-
istrations to report progress and thus to monitor implementa-
tion closely.
In order to reduce the discharge of priority substances
from industries, lists of the emissions of major emitting in-
dustries were published regularly. Furthermore, minimal re-
quirements were defined for the treatment of wastewater in
different branches of industry. According to the intervie-
wees, the main contribution made by the ICPE was the joint
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Table 4. Areas of activity – specific ICPE contribution.
Area of Activity APP Specific ICPE Contribution
Explanations by experts Author’s assessment
1. Municipal wastewater 8.5 Priority lists→ access to funds
Monitoring→ stick to targets
Medium
2. Industrial point sources 7.2 List of discharges of large emitters → follow up by
administrations
Minimal requirements→ some influence on CZ leg-
islation
Low to medium
3. Agricultural non-point
sources
2.7 Practically no contribution.
(Agenda-setting)
Zero
4. Contaminated sites
and landfills
6.8 Priority lists, but little contribution, no priority area Low
5. Fish migration 6.8 Promoted ongoing activities, priority lists → access
to Czech funds
Low to medium
6. Protected areas and
morphology
7.4 Promoted ongoing activities, but no new proposals Low
7. Accidental pollution 8.4 Original ICPE contribution High
publication of the lists of major emitting industries. The idea
was to point out the “bad guys”, but to do it jointly rather than
pitting one state against the other. Furthermore, the mon-
itoring created pressure on administrations to identify and
deal with the main dischargers in order to be able to report
progress. It is unclear, however, to what extent the ICPE pub-
lications had a direct impact on these companies. Moreover,
the impact of the definition of minimal requirements remains
uncertain. In Germany, these standards applied anyway. Ap-
parently they had some effect on the legislative process in the
Czech Republic.
In order to reduce the discharge of nutrients and pesticides
from non-point sources in agriculture, the member states
compiled recommendations for good practice and for dif-
ferent types of measures. However, they did not commit
themselves in the action program to carrying out specific
activities on the ground. As such, the ICPE’s impact re-
mained negligible or minimal. The interviewees argued that
the ICPE (and national governments) had no instruments to
influence or control farmers. This notwithstanding, it was
argued that it had been correct to include the abatement of
agricultural non-point pollution in the Elbe Action Program
and that the ICPE had contributed towards putting the topic
on the agenda. Those who gave a higher score believed that
some improvements had taken place, albeit due to other pro-
grams or measures.
The main ICPE activity with respect to the reduction of
pollution from contaminated sites and landfills was to iden-
tify relevant sites and to monitor planned and ongoing reha-
bilitation measures. The participants concurred that this was
not a primary area of ICPE activity and that its contribution
was minimal, being limited to prioritizing planned activities;
however, it did not initiate any new activities.
In order to improve fish migration, the ICPE identified sev-
eral measures to be implemented in Germany and the Czech
Republic up to 2010. The first priorities were to realize fish
passes at Geesthacht in Germany and at the weir Strˇekov at
´Ustı´ n.L. in the Czech Republic. While these and a few other
measures have been realized, others being implemented in
tributaries still need to be addressed. Overall, the ICPE con-
tribution is seen as moderate. While several respondents be-
lieved that the ICPE contributed towards the realization of
the fish pass in Geesthacht, another interviewee argued that
it was mainly promoted by the ARGE Elbe, the working
group of the German La¨nder on the Elbe. The completion of
Geesthacht did, however, increase the pressure on the Czech
Republic to move ahead with its program and, according to
one interviewee, the first fish pass in the Czech Republic was
built with “direct and indirect” support from the ICPE.
The ICPE also identified the potential for creating a num-
ber of protected areas, as well as several measures for im-
proving the morphology of the river and its tributaries in
the two countries. The accounting for these measures in
the ICPE progress reports remains somewhat opaque. While
major protected areas such as the UNESCO biotope reserve
“River Landscape Elbe”, which extends over 400 river kilo-
meters, and the Czech national park, Bohemian Switzerland,
were realized, other activities still need to be addressed.
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Table 5. Translating the qualitative assessments into quantitative
weights.
Qualitative assessment Quantitative weight (f)
Zero 0.00
Low 0.15
Low to medium 0.35
Medium 0.50
Medium to high 0.65
High 0.85
Complete 1.00
Also, there is not much progress on morphology. Accord-
ing to the interviewees, activities were driven mainly by the
states, but compiled and coordinated by the ICPE (such as
the preparation of maps). They argued that the ICPE was
the only institution adopting a basin-wide perspective, thus
“putting local egoism into larger perspective”. Again, this is
believed to have accelerated the process. It was pointed out
that in the Czech Republic, the opportunities were limited
and it remained difficult to attribute activities to the ICPE or
other factors.
In order to prevent accidental pollution, the ICPE devel-
oped an international warning and alarm plan and model,
developed recommendations for accident prevention at com-
pany level and in flood-prone areas, and published a list of
potentially hazardous plants. In general the interviewees
agreed that this is an original activity area of transbound-
ary water cooperation and that the contribution of the ICPE
was high. However, some respondents pointed out that there
might still be a certain gap between theory and practice. A
cyanide accident at a company in the Czech Republic in Jan-
uary 2006 demonstrated problems in the application of the
respective instruments by the company and within the Czech
administration. On the other hand, there was successful pre-
vention of an oil spill in the Czech Republic in March 2006.
On the basis of the explanations provided by the intervie-
wees, the author sought to estimate the no-regime counter-
factual (NRID). In order to do so, in a first step a qualitative
assessment of the level of the ICPE contribution towards ac-
tual performance APP in the different areas of activity was
carried out (Table 4). In a second step, each of the qualitative
assessments was translated into a quantitative weight (f) on
the basis of Table 5. In a third step, the NRID was calculated
for each area of activity using NRID=APP−(APP*f) (see Ta-
ble 6). The respective values of NRID were calculated for the
sake of illustration, their exact value depending, of course,
on the respective weights.
4.3.3 Effectiveness scores
For the sake of illustration, the effectiveness scores Ei for the
different areas of activity within the 1995 Elbe Action Pro-
gram were calculated as of the year 2005, using the average
scores by the participants as actual performance (APP) and
the author’s estimated no-regime counterfactual (NRID) as a
basis. In order to determine an overall effectiveness score
Eaverage the arithmetic average was formed on the basis of
the individual effectiveness scores.3
Table 6 shows that the values of Ei differ significantly
among the different areas of activity, ranging between values
of 0 and 0.82. The effectiveness was high for the develop-
ment of the international alarm plan and model (E=0.82) and
the construction of municipal wastewater treatment plants
(E=0.74). The areas of the reduction of industrial pollu-
tion (E=0.47), the improvement of river continuity for fish
migration (E=0.43) and the establishment of protected areas
(E=0.30) show intermediate levels of effectiveness. The ef-
fectiveness of the ICPE was very low (E=0) in the agricul-
tural sector. The overall average effectiveness score of 0.43
indicates that the ICPE regime had some impact, but that the
outcome can by no means be attributed to the ICPE alone.
The interviewees argued that the ICPE mainly “speeded up”
processes that would have happened at the national and sub-
national levels in any case, albeit at a slower speed. This ap-
plies in particular to the Czech Republic, where the process
would have been significantly slower in the absence of the
ICPE and where the ICPE contributed significantly towards
active measures being undertaken. However, the water ad-
ministration in the East German La¨nder also benefited from
the ICPE process.
The question remains, though, how the differences in ef-
fectiveness can be explained. A frequent explanation is that it
is easy for international water protection commissions to ad-
dress point sources of pollution, but more difficult to address
non-point sources of pollution (e.g. Gurtner-Zimmermann,
1998). The question is why this is so. Furthermore, the ac-
tivities of the ICPE went beyond point and non-point sources
of pollution. At a more general level, it can be argued instead
that the effectiveness of the ICPE was particularly high when
the main actors responsible for implementation were located
within the public sector, such as in the case of the construc-
tion of municipal wastewater treatment plants or the devel-
opment of the international alarm plan and model, and when
specific visible infrastructure measures or projects were in-
volved. By contrast, it appears that the effectiveness was rel-
atively low where the behavior of non-state actors needed
to be influenced. This applies in particular to the agricul-
tural sector, a general problem for international river pro-
tection commissions in Europe (see, for instance, Gurtner-
3Alternatively, given that the interviewees themselves empha-
sized that the different areas of activity played different roles, a
weighted average could be considered as well. Given that at least
some of the areas with lower effectiveness scores, such as the re-
habilitation of contaminated sites and landfills, were not a priority
area of activity, a weighted average would increase the effectiveness
score.
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Table 6. Calculating no-regime counterfactuals and effectiveness scores for the Elbe Action Program.
Area of Activity APP CO ICPE Contribution NRID Ei
qualitative quantitative (f)
1. Municipal wastewater 8.5 10 Medium 0.50 4.3 0.74
2. Industrial point sources 7.2 10 Low to medium 0.35 4.7 0.47
3. Agricultural non-point sources 2.7 10 Zero 0.00 2.7 0.00
4. Contaminated sites & landfills 6.8 10 Low 0.15 5.8 0.24
5. Fish migration 6.8 10 Low to medium 0.35 4.4 0.43
6. Protected areas & morphology 7.4 10 Low 0.15 6.3 0.30
7. Accidental pollution 8.4 10 High 0.85 1.3 0.82
Average 6.8 10 4.2 0.43
Zimmermann, 1998 for the Rhine). In contrast, industry ap-
pears to constitute an intermediary case, where public ad-
ministration has some influence through standard setting and
the publication of data on emissions. In the areas of im-
provement of river continuity for fish migration and the set-
ting up of protected areas, the ICPE also promoted “visible”
projects; however, it can be assumed that the ICPE was some-
what less influential in these areas, as the decision-making
process on these measures tends to involve more stakehold-
ers and to be more complex than in the area of municipal
wastewater treatment.
Overall, it should be reiterated that the quantitative find-
ings are indicative only given the limited number of inter-
views that where possible, given the relatively high variation
among the scores provided by the interviewees and given
the uncertainties associated with quantifying the no-regime
counterfactual by the author. This notwithstanding, the ef-
fectiveness analysis on the basis of the Oslo-Potsdam solu-
tion reveals very clearly that (1) the level of influence of the
ICPE and its contribution was lower than one would perhaps
have assumed on the basis of the analysis of overall goal
achievement alone, and (2) – even more importantly – that
the effectiveness varied significantly among the different ar-
eas of activities. While this was implicit in the qualitative
analysis of the ICPE’s specific contribution, the effectiveness
score made it possible to relate the ICPE’s actual contribution
(AP-NR) to its assumed best possible contribution (CO-NR).
5 Explaining the outcome of the Elbe water quality
regime
In the following, an attempt will be made to explain the out-
come described in Sect. 4. This section builds upon the ma-
terial presented in Sect. 4 and on additional information ob-
tained in the interviews, including the experts’ evaluation of
the expediency of the institutional arrangements. It is clear
from the no-regime counterfactual analysis in Sect. 4 that the
overall outcome can only partly be explained by the existence
of the ICPE regime. Therefore, alongside the institutional
set-up (Sect. 5.1) other explanatory variables have also to be
taken into account (Sect. 5.2).
5.1 ICPE approach and role of the institutional set-up
The general working mechanism of the ICPE can be summa-
rized as follows:
1. The ICPE provided a forum for identifying priority ac-
tion from a “basin” perspective. In doing so, a step-
by-step approach was pursued, in analogy to the Rhine
basin, which started with the main priorities (hot spots),
and sought to refine the targets once the primary objec-
tives had been achieved (given that Austria and Poland
did not participate, about 99% of the entire basin area
was considered). The prioritization process was carried
out by the ICPE working groups in which representa-
tives and experts from the respective governments met.
This ensured that the recommendations were developed
by those who were responsible for their implementa-
tion. The secretariat supported the working groups in
the preparation of documents. In this way, the sec-
retariat fulfilled an important editorial function, while
also having the opportunity to input ideas into the pro-
cess. Furthermore, the work of the working groups was
backed up by high level political commitment to the in-
ternational objectives. This was important for the work-
ing groups in order to be able to move forward. The
identification of priorities for action from a basin per-
spective – one goal being the protection of the North
Sea – implied an acknowledgment by both upstream and
downstream riparians that they were jointly responsible
for contributing towards the clean-up of the river. Thus,
the hydrologically induced upstream-downstream prob-
lem was transformed into a more symmetrical problem
requiring collective action. Furthermore, the prioritiza-
tion process also ensured that the goal of protecting the
North Sea was achieved at least (or low) cost.
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2. Implementation of agreed measures took place at na-
tional or sub-national levels. The fact that the imple-
mentation of agreed measures was carried out at na-
tional level had several advantages. It allowed the re-
spective administration to follow their usual procedures
and minimized international coordination costs. It also
implied that each party bore its own costs. At the same
time, the national water administrations used their in-
ternational obligations to promote their interests within
the administration and to increase their access to funds,
including national and various EU funds. Typically, dif-
ferent sectors compete for these funds, and the inter-
national obligations helped the parties to increase their
share.
3. The ICPE monitored implementation of measures by
regularly publishing progress reports on the internet,
which effectively served as an enforcement mechanism.
The ICPE is responsible for monitoring implementa-
tion, but it does not have a formal sanctioning mech-
anism in place. This is of interest, given that from
a game-theoretical perspective, a sanctioning mecha-
nism is necessary to sustain cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemma-like situations (e.g. Dombrowsky, 2007a).
However, as the interviewees argued, the fact that the
ICPE regularly published progress reports created pres-
sure on the national administrations to follow up on im-
plementation in order to be able to report on progress.
It can be argued that the progress reports increased the
accountability of the ICPE vis-a`-vis the general public
and, as such, provided not only a monitoring but ar-
guably also an enforcement mechanism that generated
an incentive to pursue implementation. The intervie-
wees also argued that, at least at the international level,
a sanctioning mechanism had not been necessary and
could even have been counter-productive, as it could
have undermined the building of trust between the two
countries. This notwithstanding, some interviewees ex-
pressed the sentiment that at times they had wished they
had stronger enforcement mechanisms in place at the
national level, in particular vis-a`-vis industry and agri-
culture.
4. A conscious attempt was made to build trust. At the
level of informal institutions, a conscious attempt was
apparently made to establish good relationships and
trust. In general, the working atmosphere was consid-
ered good to excellent, and at the working group level
in particular even friendships emerged over time. Two
factors were mentioned that promoted the building of
trust. First, both a Czech and a German representative
mentioned that a special effort was made by the Ger-
man side not to dominate the process. The Czech rep-
resentative remarked that “the German colleagues very
sensitively and in harmony with our effort agreed on the
steps how to increase” (Czech interview partner 2). The
German representative emphasized that it had been im-
portant to make it clear that the other side was not being
put down (German interview partner 1). Second, NGOs
were only granted observer status in 2004 in the context
of implementation of the EU Water Framework Direc-
tive. Two German interview partners argued that the
fact that NGOs did not participate from the beginning
had also contributed towards building trust among the
representatives from the two countries.
Overall, the above shows that the ICPE’s institutional struc-
ture and the way the work was approached have to be seen
as closely interrelated. In general, the interviewees believed
that the institutional structure “stood the test”. In response
to the question of what could have been improved with re-
gard to the institutional set-up, two aspects were mentioned.
First, some argued that some working groups, such as the
ones on Monography and Law and Procedures, had not nec-
essarily been needed. The main activity of the working group
on Law had been to organize observer status for Poland and
Austria. Furthermore, the working group on Research was
by and large limited to work in Germany. Thus, the structure
could have been leaner and, as such, more efficient.
Second, there appears to have been an issue with the so-
called coordination group. It consisted of the President and
the chairpersons of the various working groups. It usually
met once a year in between plenary sessions. While some
thought that this was actually needed, others argued that it
existed only on paper. What was lacking, according to this
latter fraction, was a group to coordinate the activities of the
different working groups at a working level. In the absence of
such a group, this gap was filled by and large by the working
group on Action Programs. However, this had led to some
tensions with other working groups, as they did not want to
be coordinated by a peer group, but to report directly to the
Commission. Some argued that the working group on Action
Programs did not necessarily have a steering function, but it
had the last say, as it took up the results of the other working
groups in order to present them in a way that could be sold
to the public.
Thus, on the basis of the interviewees’ assessments and
the above explanations, it can be argued that, apart from the
fact that the efficiency of the institutional arrangements could
perhaps have been slightly improved, the ICPE work ap-
proach and institutional structure was generally adequate and
allowed the ICPE to promote ongoing and planned national
activities effectively, at least with respect to point sources of
pollution and large visible projects. In doing so, the main
factors were (1) a careful division of labor between the in-
ternational and national levels in terms of priority setting,
implementation and monitoring, and (2) a conscious attempt
to build trust. At the same time, while the above provides
explanations for how the approach worked, establishing a di-
rect causality between institutional structure and specific out-
comes remains challenging.
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5.2 Additional explanatory variables
5.2.1 Upstream and downstream had incentives to cooper-
ate
In an upstream-downstream setting the question is whether
the upstream country has any incentive to cooperate (e.g.
LeMarquand, 1997; Marty, 2001; Dombrowsky, 2007a). In
the case of the Elbe, it can be argued that both the Czech Re-
public as the upstream country and Germany as the down-
stream country had sufficient incentives to cooperate, and
that this was an important precondition for achieving the out-
come that has been brought about. In the interviews, the fol-
lowing reasons were mentioned for cooperation on the Czech
side: an interest in good relationships more generally and ac-
cess to Western markets, both of which entail working on
environmental matters; the perceived international pressure
to improve the quality of the Elbe water; and, from 1994 on-
wards, the aspiration towards EU accession. Thus, Czech
aspirations for greater integration with the West can be seen
as a major motivation for cooperating on environmental mat-
ters. Or, to put it the other way around, water quality should
not stand in the way of broader good relations. Furthermore,
in 1994 the Czech Republic started official negotiations with
the European Union about its accession, formally joining the
EU in May 2005. Thus, from 1994 on it was clear that ac-
tivities in the framework of the ICPE would also contribute
towards the fulfilling the EU requirements in the water sec-
tor. While according to the Czech interviewees EU accession
did not play a role from the beginning, it did so at least since
1994.
While German interviewees presumed that there had also
been internal pressure to improve water quality, the Czech
representatives had not really perceived any public demand
for this. However, they all emphasized that there had been
a tradition of river basin planning in the Czech Republic, so
that the logical next step was to extend the river basin ap-
proach to the international level. Hence, going beyond di-
rect incentives, ideas and convictions apparently also played
a role, at least at the level of the Czech delegation mem-
bers. In addition, German interviewees argued that the Czech
commission members were also able to use the international
obligations to promote their own administration’s interests
internally and to increase their standing within the adminis-
tration. One German interview partner concluded that over-
all “the Czech Republic cooperated because it was in its own
interest, not because it wanted to do something good for Ger-
many. Otherwise there would have been more calls for finan-
cial contributions” (German interview partner 2).
Germany, of course, had an inherent interest in cooperat-
ing, as it benefited from pollution control upstream; however,
it also played its part: “Hamburg of course also did what it
demanded to be done upstream.” (German interview partner
2). Furthermore, it was argued that German defection from
the project would have undermined its credibility. In addi-
tion, as one Czech interviewee mentioned, the goal to protect
the North Sea provided direct incentives for Germany. In-
ternal pressure within Germany to clean up the river was not
explicitly mentioned as an argument, but it too can be ex-
pected to have played a role. There was also a commitment
to the polluter-pays principle, and Germany was also obliged,
of course, to fulfill EU regulations.
5.2.2 Cooperation took place under favorable framework
conditions
The second external explanation for why the countries were
relatively successful is that cooperation took place under fa-
vorable framework conditions. First, the interviewees em-
phasized that once cooperation became possible after the fall
of the Iron Curtain, there was real enthusiasm and the polit-
ical will to move quickly. The high political will to address
the problems was reflected by the fact that the ICPE treaty
was negotiated within nine months and signed five days af-
ter German reunification. Thus, the fall of the Berlin wall
provided a “window of opportunity”.
Second, the partial breakdown of industrial production in
the former German Democratic Republic – and partly also
in the Czech Republic – contributed significantly towards an
improvement in the quality of the Elbe water. This is an im-
portant external factor that explains the relatively high level
of goal achievement for goal 1a.
Third, an important prerequisite for the implementation of
measures was the availability of funds. In this context, dif-
ferent types of EU funds played a role. One interview partner
argued: “Both countries were able to use the ICPE to direct
EU funds into the water sector. In the absence of such EU
funds, cooperation might be difficult to achieve” (German
interview partner 2).
Fourth, given that the middle stretch of the Elbe is much
less regulated than other European rivers, the achievement of
comparatively healthy eco-systems in this section of the river
was much less challenging than, for instance, in the Czech
Republic or on the Rhine.
Fifth, a Czech interview partner also pointed out the fact
that the officials and experts working with each other all had
a high and balanced level of professionalism. Thus, techni-
cal capacity on both sides was high, which in turn facilitated
dialogue.
5.2.3 Factors inhibiting cooperation
In response to the question of which factors inhibited suc-
cess, the limited ability to control industry and agriculture
along with complexities at the national level were mentioned
(see above).
In other contexts it was mentioned that there were some-
times cultural differences as well, e.g. in terms of addressing
conflicts directly or dealing with information flows, but this
was also perceived as a generational problem. Furthermore,
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the absence of a common working language was perceived
by some as a problem. Others thought that they had managed
quite well even with poor English, and apparently the situa-
tion is changing as younger people join the process. The fact
that all staff members of the secretariat need to be bilingual
was perceived as very helpful in facilitating communication.
Overall, it can be concluded that despite a certain language
barrier there were no major factors inhibiting international
cooperation. Instead, factors hampering effectiveness lie in
the limited ability of the commission members to influence
complex domestic policy processes.
6 Conclusions
In order to learn more about the design of adequate insti-
tutions for transboundary water management, this paper ana-
lyzed the role of institutional design in the outcomes of water
quality and ecology-related work carried out by the Interna-
tional Commission for the Protection of the Elbe.
The study pursued a mixed methodological approach that
included both qualitative and quantitative elements. In gen-
eral, it can be argued that the quantitative approach of the
Oslo-Potsdam solution for measuring effectiveness provided
analytical clarity and contributed towards showing the differ-
ent levels of effectiveness in the different areas of activity. At
the same time, the qualitative approach contributed towards
a better understanding of the causal relationships. Given that
the number of interviews remained comparatively small, the
quantitative results are indicative only.
Overall, the paper shows that the countries were relatively
successful in achieving their overall goals. While the ICPE
generally showed a high level of compliance, one main find-
ing is that the ICPE’s contribution towards achieving the
goals varied significantly among the different areas of activ-
ity, and that much would also have been achieved in its ab-
sence. The ICPE’s contribution was greatest where the main
responsibility for action lay with the public authorities, such
as in the area of wastewater treatment and the establishment
of an international alarm plan and model. Its contribution
was practically zero in the reduction of non-point pollution
from agriculture, where success depended on the behavior
of individual private actors (farmers). It was intermediate
where multiple parties were involved in the decision-making
process, such as in the area of fish migration or the establish-
ment of protected areas.
The commission supported the countries’ activities by
serving as a forum for the identification of priority action
from a basin perspective. The resulting international obliga-
tions increased the power of participating national adminis-
trations and their access to funds. At the same time, the Com-
mission’s reporting to the public served as an enforcement
mechanism. In this way, the ICPE speeded up implemen-
tation, in particular in the Czech Republic. At the informal
level, cooperation was fostered by the fact that the stronger
party made a conscious effort not to dominate the process.
Overall, the institutional set-up and work approach can thus
be considered to be conducive to problem solving, at least
with regard to specific “visible” projects undertaken by the
public administrations.
The relatively positive outcome was also supported by
favorable framework conditions, in the sense that not only
downstream but – on account of broader economic interests
– upstream too had an interest in cooperating. Furthermore,
the fall of the Berlin wall generated a high level of politi-
cal will to improve the situation. In addition, both countries
benefited from access to external EU funds.
Overall, it can be argued that the Rhine model of trans-
boundary cooperation was replicated successfully in the Elbe
basin. Furthermore, it appears that the economic inequality
in the Elbe basin, with the upstream party being the econom-
ically weaker party, promoted rather than inhibited cooper-
ation. The Czech Republic’s desire to achieve greater inte-
gration with Western Europe clearly increased its incentive
to cooperate. At the same time, in both the Rhine and the
Elbe basins, the general work approach of setting basin-wide
priorities, national level implementation and international
monitoring was conducive to problem solving and hence ap-
plies to conditions of economic equality and downstream-
upstream dominance alike.
The question is: under what conditions does the
ICPE/ICPR model become transferable? It certainly be-
comes so for upstream-downstream and arguably also for
border water quality conflicts where all parties recognize the
need to protect downstream lakes or regional seas. Further-
more, the approach is most powerful when the responsibility
for such activities lies with actors in the public sector. The
question is whether it also applies to situations where the up-
stream party – or the party appropriating the resource first –
is economically more powerful and where water quantity or
water regulation issues are at stake. But still, in procedural
terms, the idea of a forum for problem solving and the appar-
ent attempts to build trust might be of wider applicability.
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